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Tenure
Civil Rights
Education, employment in

32 F.Supp.2d 675
United States District Court,
S.D. New York.

Although tenure decisions are not immune from
review under Title VII or the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a
court should exercise caution in second-guessing
a tenure decision and should not sit as a super
tenure-review committee. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C.A. §
626(b); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–5.

Cynthia N. PETERSON, Plaintiff,
v.
The CITY COLLEGE, The City University of New
York, Defendants.
No. 92 Civ. 7952 (DC).
|
Jan. 21, 1999.
Associate professor who was denied tenure brought age
and sex discrimination action against university. On
university’s motion for summary judgment, and
professor’s motion to preclude university from offering
any defense and for sanctions, the District Court, Chin, J.,
held that: (1) university did not discriminate against
professor on basis of age or gender; (2) professor had full
and fair opportunity to conduct discovery; (3) professor
could not establish claim of retaliation; and (4) university
would not be sanctioned for alleged discovery violations.

1 Cases that cite this headnote

[3]

University did not discriminate against associate
professor on basis of professor’s gender or age,
in violation of Title VII or the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
even if professor was more qualified than her
colleagues and there were some minor
irregularities in her tenure review, in view of
university’s
legitimate
non-discriminatory
reasons for denying tenure, namely, professor’s
weakness in areas of scholarly work and
academic publication. Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, § 7(b), 29 U.S.C.A. §
626(b); Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–5.

University’s motion granted; professor’s motion denied.

West Headnotes (7)
[1]

Civil Rights
Education, employment in
Civil Rights
Education, employment in

Civil Rights
Motive or intent; pretext
Ultimate issue in an employment discrimination
case is whether the plaintiff has met her burden
of proving that the adverse employment decision
was motivated at least in part by an
impermissible reason, that is, that there was
discriminatory intent.

Cases that cite this headnote

10 Cases that cite this headnote
[4]

[2]

Civil Rights

Federal Civil Procedure
Time for consideration of motion
Associate professor was afforded full and fair
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opportunity to conduct discovery, which was
thus sufficient to grant university’s motion for
summary judgment in professor’s action
alleging age and gender discrimination, where
professor had five years to conduct discovery,
university substantially complied with discovery
obligations, and professor could not complain in
any event absent evidence that she conducted
any depositions. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 56(f),
28 U.S.C.A.
Cases that cite this headnote

[5]

Labor and Employment
Exercise of Rights or Duties; Retaliation
To prevail on a claim that adverse employment
action was result of retaliation, plaintiff must
demonstrate that: (1) she was engaged in
protected activity; (2) defendants were aware of
the activity; (3) defendants took some adverse
employment action against her; and (4) a causal
connection exists between her participation in a
protected activity and the adverse employment
action.

reasons.
1 Cases that cite this headnote

[7]

Federal Civil Procedure
Failure to Comply; Sanctions
Defendant university would not be sanctioned
for failing to produce documents sought by
plaintiff professor, in action alleging age and
gender discrimination, where university
represented that all requested documents had
been subject of diligent search, that all located
documents had been produced, and that
university had not destroyed or refused to
produce documents, and plaintiff had apparently
not examined all documents that were made
available.
Cases that cite this headnote

Attorneys and Law Firms
Cases that cite this headnote

[6]

Education
Exercise of rights; retaliation
Public Employment
Causal connection; temporal proximity
University’s denial of associate professor’s
tenure application was not result of retaliation
for professor’s participation in discrimination
lawsuit
and
other
conduct
protesting
discrimination, absent more than conclusory
allegations as to professor’s protected activities
and claim that such activities caused denial of
tenure, particularly in view of university’s
concrete showing that professor was denied
tenure for legitimate, non-discriminatory

*676 Anthony Feldmesser, New York City, Legal Aid
Services for the Elderly, by Jonathan A. Weiss, New York
City, for plaintiff.
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York,
by Judith T. Kramer, Assistant Attorney General, New
York City.

OPINION
CHIN, District Judge.
In this case, plaintiff Cynthia N. Peterson alleges that
defendants The City College of the City of New York
(“City College”) and The City University of New York

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/56
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1708

2

2

et al.: Panel: Age Discrimination Issues in Higher Education - Handout: P

Herbert, William 3/10/2017
For Educational Use Only

Peterson v. City College, 32 F.Supp.2d 675 (1999)
84 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 165, 132 Ed. Law Rep. 321

(“CUNY”) engaged in a “text-book example of gender
and age discrimination” by denying her tenure.
Defendants move for summary judgment. Peterson
moves, on the basis of defendants’ alleged failures in
discovery, to preclude defendants from offering any
defense to her claims of discrimination and for sanctions.

with teaching in History & Theory of Architecture”; and
(3) “Design studio instruction and design methodology in
basic years.” (Solomon Aff.Ex. C). The positions were
ranked in terms of departmental need. (Id.). For reasons
that are not clear, however, the SOA could only fill one
tenure-track position and one visiting full-time position.

In support of her broad claims of discrimination, Peterson
offers no concrete evidence. Instead, she relies solely on
her own, wholly conclusory affidavit. In contrast,
defendants have come forward with substantial evidence
to show that Peterson was denied tenure for legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons. On the record before the
Court, a reasonable jury could only conclude that
Peterson was denied tenure not because of her gender or
age but for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.

Based on the SOA’s needs, the Executive Committee,
which was responsible for reviewing applications and
making recommendations for appointments, decided that
the tenure-track position should be filled by a candidate
qualified to teach structure, and that the visiting line
should be filled with an archivist. (Id.). Jonathan
Ochshorn was selected by the Committee for the
tenure-track position over Peterson and three other male
candidates.

*677 Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is granted and the amended complaint is
dismissed. Peterson’s motion for sanctions is denied.

In a letter dated July 9, 1982 to City College’s Director of
Affirmative Action, Peterson contested Ochshorn’s
selection, claiming that her credentials for the position
were stronger. (Id. Ex. B). Professor John Deans,
Chairman of the Executive Committee, explained the
Committee’s reasons for selecting Ochshorn in a letter
dated July 27, 1982. (Id. Ex. C). Deans explained that the
Committee selected Ochshorn over the other candidates
principally because he was the only candidate with a
background in structure, who was prepared to teach
structure classes in September 1982. Peterson was not
prepared to teach structure in September 1982.
Accordingly, the Committee did not recommend her
appointment. (Id.).

BACKGROUND
A. The Facts
1. Employment Chronology
a. Initial Appointment (1973)
City College’s School of Architecture and Environmental
Studies (the “SOA”) hired Peterson in 1973 as an adjunct
professor. (Defs.Am. 56.1 Statement ¶ 2). Peterson, who
did not have any prior teaching experience, was a 1965
graduate of Yale University with a bachelor’s and
master’s degree in architecture. (Id. ¶ 1; Solomon Aff.Ex.
A at 1). Prior to teaching at City College, Peterson was
employed by a number of architecture firms and also
maintained her own practice. (Solomon Aff.Ex. A at 2).
Peterson was rehired to various adjunct positions through
the summer of 1986.

b. Application for Tenure–Track Position (1982)
In August 1982, Peterson applied for a full-time,
tenure-track position at the SOA. (Defs.Am. 56.1
Statement ¶ 3). The SOA originally advertised three
full-time positions in the Spring of 1982:(1) “Teaching in
Structure and technical related subjects”; (2) “Archivist

The Office of the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs,
however, declined to approve the appointment of
Ochshorn as an assistant professor, ostensibly because he
did not have a master’s degree. (Id. ¶ 9). Peterson
contends, without any evidentiary support, that Ochshorn
was not appointed because the SOA withdrew the
tenure-track position as a result of her complaint. (See Pl.
Response to Defs. 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 4, 7).

c. Application for Tenure–Track Position (1985)
On March 11, 1985, Peterson again applied for a full-time
tenure-track position. (Solomon Aff.Ex. D). The
advertisement for the position stated that an applicant
“should have experience in architectural practice and in
teaching architectural technology and architectural
design.” (Id. Ex. E). Peterson contends that the job
description for this position was written specifically for
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Alan Feigenberg, a younger male who was Assistant to
the Dean at that time. (Pl. Response to Defs. 56.1
Statement ¶ 8). Neither Peterson nor Feigenberg,
however, was selected for the position. Ultimately, a
woman, Megan Lawrence, was selected and appointed.
When the SOA originally advertised the opening, three
candidates applied: Feigenberg, Lawrence, and Peterson.
The Executive Committee screened the candidates,
interviewed them, and selected Lawrence for *678 the
position. That selection was forwarded to the Personnel &
Budget (“P & B”) Committee. The P & B Committee
reconsidered the candidates, and voted to recommend
Peterson for the job instead of Lawrence.
The SOA’s then-acting Dean, Donald E. Mintz,
determined (in a detailed letter to both committees dated
June 17, 1985) that the P & B Committee had the right
and responsibility to reject recommendations of the
Executive Committee, but that its authority “would be
exceeded by introducing a candidate not recommended by
the Executive Committee.” (Solomon Aff.Ex. L). Dean
Mintz decided, therefore, to disregard the P & B
Committee’s “rejection” of Lawrence, and accepted the
Executive Committee’s selection of Lawrence for the
position. (Id.).
On June 19, 1985, Peterson filed a grievance with City
College’s Affirmative Action office, contesting the
“hiring procedure” used for the 1985 position. (Id. Exs. F,
I, J). A grievance panel was convened to investigate this
matter and reported its conclusions in a December 4, 1985
letter addressed to City College’s President. (Id. Ex. K).
The panel determined that Dean Mintz’s interpretation of
the P & B Committee’s role and responsibility was
correct. Accordingly, the panel rejected the P & B
Committee’s “recommendation” of Peterson for the
position.
In reaching that conclusion, the panel determined inter
alia that all three candidates “had many years of
experience in the department .... [and they] were all
competent and eligible for the job.” (Id.). Indeed, the
“administrative faculty of the school neither expressed
strong preference for a particular candidate nor the
opinion that one was distinctly superior in credentials.”
(Id.).
Accordingly, in a letter dated January 10, 1986, the
SOA’s Dean, J. Max Bond Jr., notified Megan Lawrence
that she had been selected for the position. (Id. Ex. G).

Lawrence accepted the position in a letter dated January
20, 1986. (Id.).
On January 10, 1986, Bond offered Peterson a position as
a non-tenure-track Assistant Professor on a substitute line
for the remainder of the 1985–86 academic year. (Id. Ex.
M). Peterson rejected the offer, and decided to continue in
her adjunct position for the spring of 1986. (Id. Ex. N).

d. Appointment to Tenure–Track Position (1986)
Peterson was appointed to a full-time, tenure-track
position as an Associate Professor at the SOA effective
September 1, 1986. (Defs. Am. 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 2, 19).
Bond officially offered Peterson the position in a letter
dated September 9, 1986. (Solomon Aff.Ex. O).1 The
offer letter stated that the appointment was “subject to
annual review and reappointment for one year periods
until tenure is achieved.” (Id.). It also stated that the
“general terms and conditions of ... employment are
regulated by the Bylaws of the Trustees of the City
University.” (Id.).

2. Application for Tenure (1990–91)
a. Tenure Criteria and Confidentiality of Proceedings
CUNY Bylaws provide that after serving for five full
years, an Associate Professor “shall have tenure effective
on the first day of September following his/her
reappointment for the sixth full year.” (Id. Ex. P).
CUNY’s Statement of the Board of Higher Education on
Academic Personnel Practice provides that tenure
decisions “shall” be based on the following criteria: (1)
teaching effectiveness (“clear evidence of the individual’s
ability and diligence as a teacher”); and (2) scholarship
and professional growth (“[e]vidence of new and creative
work shall be sought in the candidate’s published research
or in his instructional materials when they incorporate
new ideas or scholarly research”). (Id. Ex. Q). In addition,
the following factors “may be supplementary
considerations”: (1) service to the institution; and (2)
service to the public. (Id.).
*679 Appointment committee minutes on tenure decisions
do not reflect the contents of the discussion as to an
applicant. CUNY’s Policy on Personnel & Budget
Procedures, adopted by the Board of Higher Education in
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the City of New York on December 18, 1967 (the
“Max–Kahn Policy”), provides that “actions upon
motions, and not the discussion which led to such actions,
should be recorded, unless the P & B should order, by a
majority vote, that the discussions be recorded.”
(Solomon Sanctions Aff.Ex. E at ¶ B.1.a). Moreover,
voting on such motions should be by “secret ballot.” (Id.).
The Max–Kahn Policy further directs that discussions on
personnel actions in P & B meetings are confidential, and
that it is “professional misconduct for a member of a P &
B committee to disclose the substance or even the nature
of the discussion at the P & B meeting.” (Id. at B.2).

b. Peterson’s Tenure Application and Denial
Peterson applied for tenure during her fourth year (the
1989–1990 academic year) as a full-time Associate
Professor so that the process for her reappointment with
tenure could be considered and completed by December
1, 1990 (Peterson’s fifth year—the 1990–1991 academic
year), the deadline for notification of non-reappointment.
(Defs.Am. 56.1 Statement ¶ 21). Among the materials
considered by the various committees in passing on the
tenure application were Peterson’s: (1) personnel file
(including at least three peer evaluations and one
performance evaluation from Bond dated March 13,
1989); (2) curriculum vitae; and (3) work portfolio. (See
Solomon Sanctions Aff.Ex. C; Solomon Aff.Ex. V).2
In the first stage of academic review for tenure, the
Department Executive Committee votes twice on whether
an applicant should be granted tenure. The Executive
Committee rejected Peterson’s tenure application in its
two votes, which took place on February 3, 1990 and May
3, 1990. (See Defs.Am. 56.1 Statement ¶ 22; Solomon
Aff. ¶ 24; Solomon Sanctions Aff.Ex. C; Irvine Aff. ¶ 5).
The
tally
of
the
votes
was
2–3–0–2
(yes-no-abstain-absent) for the first vote, and 1–4–0–2 for
the second vote. (Irvine Aff. ¶ 5). Although the minutes
for the February 3 and May 3, 1990 meetings could not be
found, the following five faculty members were on the
Executive Committee for the Spring of 1990: Gordon
Gebert (Chair), Carmi Bee, Peter Gisolfi, John Loomis,
and Ghislaine Hermanuz. There were also two students on
the Executive Committee for the Spring of 1990, whose
names are not known. (Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 14).
Following the established review process, Peterson
appealed the Executive Committee’s decision to the
SOA’s Divisional P & B Committee. Her appeal was

granted—the SOA P & B voted in favor of granting her
tenure—in a 4–0–1–0 vote on May 9, 1990. (Irvine Aff. ¶
5; Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 13). The members of the
SOA P & B Committee who voted on Peterson’s appeal
were Gebert, Barnett, Cordingley, Friedberg, and Ryder.
(Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 13).
In accordance with the established review process,
Peterson’s tenure application was next considered by the
City College Review Committee (the “Review
Committee”), a college-wide committee. The Review
Committee overwhelmingly rejected Peterson’s tenure
*680 application in a 1–8–0–1 vote on June 12, 1990. The
voting members of the Review Committee were City
College’s Provost Robert Pfeffer and the ten Deans of the
Schools and Divisions of the college as follows: (1)
Leonard Beckum (Education); (2) Paul Sherwin
(Humanities); (3) Edna Neuman (Nursing); (4) Jeffrey
Rosen (Social Science); (5) J. Max Bond (Architecture);
(6) Charles Watkins (Engineering); (7) Alan Fiellin
(General Education and Guidance); (8) Virginia Red
(Art); (9) George I. Lythcott (Medical); and (10) Michael
Arons (Sciences). Arons was absent for the vote. (Id. ¶
12).
On June 21, 1990 Dean Morris Silberberg of Faculty
Relations officially notified Peterson of the Review
Committee’s recommendation that she not be reappointed
with tenure, and that her employment at City College
would end on August 13, 1991. (Solomon Aff.Ex. T). In
the meantime, again in accordance with established
procedures, Peterson appealed the Review Committee’s
decision to City College’s president, Bernard W.
Harleston.3
Harleston notified Peterson in a letter dated October 29,
1990 that “[a]fter a complete and thorough review of your
curriculum vitae and the additional materials that came to
my attention during your appeal, it is my academic
judgment not to disturb the negative decision of [the
Review Committee].” (Id. Ex. U).
On November 5, 1990, Peterson wrote to Harleston
requesting an explanation for his denial of her appeal.
Harleston responded in a letter dated November 14, 1990.
(Id. Ex. V). He explained that in reaching his decision he
reviewed Peterson’s “record of teaching performance,
productive scholarship, research and publications,
professional activity and service to the College.” (Id.). He
concluded that Peterson’s “achievements in the areas of
scholarly productivity, research, publication and
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professional activity were not sufficient to warrant a
tenure appointment.” (Id.). In addition, he commented
that peer teaching evaluations raised questions as to
Peterson’s level of technical experience and knowledge,
level of design development, and knowledge of computer
applications. (Id.).
At the same time Peterson was appealing her tenure
denial to Harleston, on June 19, 1990, she also filed a
Step I Grievance as to the same issue. (See Solomon
Sanctions Aff.Ex. C (Step I Grievance form)). Silberberg
denied Peterson’s Step I grievance in a decision dated
May 6, 1991. (Id. Ex. C (5/6/91 grievance decision)).
Peterson filed a Step 2 grievance on May 9, 1991.
Peterson later withdrew the Step 2 grievance. (Id. Ex. C
(11/22/91 letter from University Director of Labor
Hearings & Appeals)).

3. Statistics
During the last five years of Peterson’s employment at the
SOA, it hired nine full-time, tenure-track faculty
members. (Solomon Aff. ¶¶ 32–34 and Exs. W, X).4 Of
those nine individuals, five (including Peterson) were
women. Two of these women were tenured: (1) Labelle
Prussin, who was hired with tenure (and subsequently
resigned); and (2) Ghislaine Hermanuz, who was granted
tenure in September 1991.
Of the nine individuals hired to tenure-track
appointments, two were older than Peterson. (Id.). When
Hermanuz was granted tenure in 1991, she was then 49
years old. *681 Horst Berger was granted tenure in 1989
at the age of 63, and Alan Feigenberg was granted tenure
in 1991 at the age of 47.

B. Prior Proceedings
1. Melani v. Board of Higher Education of the City of
New York, No. 73 Civ. 5434(LPG)
Melani was a class action against CUNY brought on
behalf of female employees who alleged discrimination
based on gender. The case was settled by a consent decree
that became effective on September 10, 1984. The
consent decree resolved “in full all claims against the
defendant by the named plaintiffs and class members ....
for damages, back pay, benefits, injunctive, declaratory or
any other relief for the alleged unlawful discrimination,

past and present, up to and including the effective date of
th[e] Decree.” (Id. Ex. Y). Peterson was a member of that
class and is bound by that decree. (See Defs.Am. 56.1
Statement ¶¶ 32–35; Solomon Aff.Exs. Z, AA, BB, CC;
Am.Cmplt. ¶¶ 1, 19, 26, 28).
Indeed, pursuant to the Melani consent decree, Peterson
filed a “Claim Form for Subclass III Members” on
January 12, 1985, in which she made “a verified claim of
sex discrimination in denial of full-time employment on
the instruction staff of [CUNY] on or after December 21,
1970 and up to September 10, 1984.” (Solomon Aff.Ex.
Z). Because no full-time appointments were made in
Peterson’s discipline during the relevant period, her claim
was denied on October 29, 1985. (Id. Ex. AA). Peterson
appealed on December 17, 1985. (Id. Ex. BB). In
exchange for $1,750, however, Peterson agreed to
withdraw her appeal on May 6, 1986. (Id. CC).5

2. Prior Discrimination Charges
Other than the claim in Melani, Peterson never filed any
formal charges of discrimination against defendants
concerning events that occurred prior to her full-time,
tenure-track appointment in 1986. (Defs.Am. 56.1
Statement ¶ 18).
As to the denial of tenure, however, Peterson did file a
charge of discrimination with the New York State
Division of Human Rights and the EEOC on February 21,
1991. In that charge, Peterson alleged that she was denied
tenure “because of my sex (Female) and because of my
age (53) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ... and in violation of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967.” (Solomon Aff.Ex. DD).
In a determination dated July 30, 1992, the EEOC held
that defendants’ “hiring and tenure appointments failed to
show any disparate treatment of persons based upon sex,”
and that “the evidence obtained during the investigation
does not establish a violation of [Title VII].” (Id. Ex. EE).
The EEOC noted that during the course of Peterson’s
tenure-track employment at the SOA, the SOA hired nine
full-time faculty on tenure lines, five of whom (including
Peterson) were females. (Id.). In addition, in the prior five
years, the SOA had granted tenure to more females than
males.
Accordingly, the EEOC dismissed Peterson’s complaint,
at the same time giving her the right to sue in federal
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court. (Id.).

3. The Instant Case
Peterson, pro se, commenced suit by filing a complaint on
October 29, 1992. The case was originally assigned to
Judge Louis J. Freeh, but was reassigned to Judge Robert
P. Patterson on August 19, 1993. Peterson subsequently
obtained counsel (who agreed to take on the case at the
request of the Court), and an amended complaint was
filed on September 6, 1994. Peterson moved to compel
the production of documents, which *682 was granted in
part and denied in part in a decision dated November 18,
1994.
Thereafter, the case was reassigned to me. On July 21,
1995, Peterson moved for a contempt order and for
sanctions alleging that defendants had failed to produce
documents that were the subject of their previous motion
to compel. In an order dated March 18, 1996, I denied that
motion. In a conference with the parties on April 18,
1997, I set a final discovery deadline of September 12,
1997.

relief, however, Peterson only seeks back pay to
September 1991, when her employment with defendants
ceased. (See also Pl.Mem. at 16 (apparently conceding
that she is not entitled to relief for conduct prior to 1986,
Peterson contends that the Court has jurisdiction to grant
her relief “for defendants’ discriminatory acts from the
time she was appointed to a tenure-track position”).

2. Defendants
Defendants contend that any discrimination claim based
on actions that occurred prior to April 26, 1990 are time
barred. (Defs.Mem. at 9–12). Defendants also contend
that claims for acts prior to April 26, 1990 were not the
subject of Peterson’s EEOC charge, and are therefore
jurisdictionally barred. (Id. at 12–14). Even assuming
Peterson’s claims concerning conduct that occurred prior
to September 1984 are not defective, defendants contend
that claims based on events during this time period are
barred based on the Melani consent decree. (Id. at 15–17).
Finally, defendants contend that, regardless of the Court’s
rulings concerning jurisdiction and the statute of
limitations, Peterson’s amended complaint must be
dismissed on the merits. (Id. at 17–26).

These motions followed.

C. The Parties’ Allegations
1. Plaintiff
Peterson alleges that the treatment she received by
defendants was a “text-book example of gender and age
discrimination, which worsened constantly and which was
increased in retaliation for her successful pursuit of relief
in a class action against defendants for gender bias.”
(Am.Cmplt.¶ 1). She does not set forth separate causes of
action in her amended complaint, but asserts that
jurisdiction is based on both Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e–5, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(the “ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5). Thus, the
amended complaint asserts claims for gender and age
discrimination as well as retaliation. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 32; see also
Peterson Aff. ¶¶ 14, 49; Pl. Response to Defs. 56.1
Statement ¶ 108; Pl.Mem. at 14–15).

Any claims based on events pre-dating the Melani decree
are barred, as Peterson was a member of the class.
Otherwise, however, solely for purposes of this motion, I
assume that there are no viable statute of limitations
and/or jurisdictional defenses to Peterson’s claims. Thus,
with respect to the events post-dating the Melani decree, I
address only defendants’ contention that summary
judgment dismissing the amended complaint should be
granted on the merits. I also assume, without deciding the
issue, that Peterson would be entitled to rely on the 1982
and 1985 decisions at least as background evidence to
support her claims of discrimination as to the denial of
tenure.

DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards

It is unclear for what time period Peterson seeks relief.
The amended complaint alleges discrimination as to
defendants’ 1982 and 1985 decisions not to select
Peterson for a tenure-track position. In the prayer for

1. Summary Judgment
The standards governing motions for summary judgment
are well-settled. Summary judgment may be granted when
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“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ...
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–87, 106 S.Ct.
1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Accordingly, the Court’s
task is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth
of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue *683 for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To
create an issue for trial, there must be sufficient evidence
in the record supporting a jury verdict in the nonmoving
party’s favor. See id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, however, the
nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita, 475 U .S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. The
nonmoving party may not rest upon mere “conclusory
allegations or denials,” but must set forth “concrete
particulars” showing that a trial is needed. National Union
Fire Ins. Co. v. Deloach, 708 F.Supp. 1371, 1379
(S.D.N.Y.1989) (quoting R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn &
Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir.1984)).

2. Title VII & ADEA Burdens of Proof
The “ultimate issue” in an employment discrimination
case is whether the plaintiff has met her burden of proving
that the adverse employment decision was motivated at
least in part by an “impermissible reason,” that is, that
there was discriminatory intent. Fields v. New York State
Office of Mental Retardation and Dev. Disabilities, 115
F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir.1997); see St. Mary’s Honor Center
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d
407 (1993); Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332,
1336 (2d Cir.1997) (en banc ), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
1075, 118 S.Ct. 851, 139 L.Ed.2d 752 (1998). Plaintiffs
have generally sought to meet that burden by using a
“mixed-motives” analysis, see de la Cruz v. New York
City Human Resources Admin. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 82
F.3d 16, 23 (2d Cir.1996); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
958 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826,
113 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992), or by proving
“pretext” under the three-part test first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in McDonnell–Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973),
see Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); de la
Cruz, 82 F.3d at 20.
[1]

As articulated in recent years, the three-step
McDonnell–Douglas test theoretically operates as
follows. First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
of unlawful discrimination by showing that (1) he or she
is a member of a protected class (2) who was qualified for
his or her position (3) who suffered an adverse
employment action (4) under circumstances giving rise to
an inference of discrimination. See McDonnell–Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Shumway v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir.1997). Second,
if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a rebuttable
presumption of discrimination arises and the burden then
“shifts” to the defendant to articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.
See Stratton v. Dep’t for the Aging for the City of New
York, 132 F.3d 869, 879 (2d Cir.1997); Fisher, 114 F.3d
at 1335–36. Third, if the defendant articulates a
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the presumption
of discrimination is rebutted and it “simply drops out of
the picture.” St. Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 510–11, 113 S.Ct.
2742. The plaintiff must then show, without the benefit of
any presumptions, that it is more likely than not that the
employer’s decision was motivated at least in part by a
discriminatory reason. Because the defendant has at this
point offered a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions,
the plaintiff must show that the proffered reason is in
reality a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See Fisher,
114 F.3d at 1337.
Although the McDonnell–Douglas framework has been
with us for some twenty-five years, it has proven at times
to be confusing and unworkable. See, e.g., Norton v.
Sam’s Club, 145 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1001, 119 S.Ct. 511, 142 L.Ed.2d 424 (1998)
(describing cases interpreting McDonnell Douglas as a
“thick accretion” that “should not obscure the simple
principle that” the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of
persuasion in discrimination cases); Greenway v. Buffalo
Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir.1998) (commenting
that requiring juries to “play the ping-pong-like match of
shifting burdens is confusing”). For this reason, I believe
that the McDonnell–Douglas test has outlived its
usefulness *684 and should be discarded. Instead, courts
should focus on the “ultimate issue”—whether the
plaintiff has proven that it is more likely than not that the
employer’s decision was motivated at least in part by an
“impermissible,” or discriminatory, reason. See generally
Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell
Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in
Discrimination Cases, 64 Brook.L.Rev. 659 (1998);
Lapsley v. Columbia Univ., 999 F.Supp. 506, 513–16
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(S.D.N.Y.1998).
In the summary judgment context, a more direct approach
would refocus attention on what should be the central
inquiry: the evidence, or lack of evidence, of
discrimination in a particular case. In considering a
summary judgment motion, courts should address the
ultimate issue by examining whether the plaintiff has
presented sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury
to conclude that a defendant’s decisions were motivated at
least in part by an impermissible reason. See Fisher, 114
F.3d at 1347. The court should conduct this inquiry in the
following manner: first, by evaluating plaintiff’s proof,
direct or otherwise, of discrimination; second, by
evaluating defendant’s proof that it did not discriminate,
including evidence of defendant’s explanations for its
decisions; and third, by considering the evidence as a
whole, resolving all conflicts in the proof and drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
In considering the ultimate issue, a factfinder at trial or a
court considering a motion for summary judgment must
bear two concepts in mind. First, the issue is intentional
discrimination—the plaintiff has the burden at all times of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or
she was the victim of intentional discrimination. See St.
Mary’s, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (stating that the
“ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff
remains at all times with the plaintiff”) (quoting Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089)). It is not enough that the
plaintiff was unfairly treated or that a defendant’s stated
reasons for its employment actions are proven to be
pretextual. Rather, while unfair treatment and a
defendant’s false statements may constitute “pieces of
circumstantial evidence” that support a claim of
intentional discrimination, the evidence as a whole must
be sufficient to sustain an “ultimate finding” of intentional
discrimination. Fisher, 114 F.3d at 1338.
Second, at the same time, proof of intentional
discrimination is often elusive. Because an employer’s
“intent and state of mind are implicated,” Meiri v. Dacon,
759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829,
106 S.Ct. 91, 88 L.Ed.2d 74 (1985), “direct, smoking gun,
evidence of discrimination” is rarely available. Richards
v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 668 F.Supp. 259, 265
(S.D.N.Y.1987), aff’d, 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir.1988).
Courts must continue to be mindful that “ ‘clever men
may easily conceal their motivations.’ ” Robinson v. 12
Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir.1979)

(quoting United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d
1179, 1185 (8th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042,
95 S.Ct. 2656, 45 L.Ed.2d 694 (1975)); accord Ramseur
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d
Cir.1989); see also Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1187 (“[If] there is
at the very least a thick cloud of smoke,” an employer
must “convince the factfinder that, despite the smoke,
there is no fire.”) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 266, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268
(1989)). All a plaintiff need do is persuade a finder of
fact, from all the evidence in the record, that it is more
likely than not that the adverse employment decision was
motivated at least in part by an impermissible reason.

3. Tenure Denial
The Second Circuit has “repeatedly noted that tenure
decisions involve unique factors that set them apart from
other employment decisions.” Batra v. Pace Univ., No. 90
Civ. 4315, 1998 WL 684621, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.30,
1998) (citing Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420,
1434–35 (2d Cir.1995), reh’g en banc, 114 F.3d 1332 (2d
Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075, 118 S.Ct. 851, 139
L.Ed.2d 752 (1998); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d
85, 92 (2d Cir.1984); Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60 (2d
Cir.1980)). Because tenure decisions “involve a myriad of
considerations and are made by numerous *685
individuals and committees over a lengthy period of time,
a plaintiff ‘faces an uphill battle in her efforts to prove
discrimination ... in the refusal to grant her tenure.’ ” Id.
(quoting Kawatra v. Medgar Evers College, No. 86
Civ.1946, 1997 WL 722703, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.25,
1997)).
[2]

Thus, even though tenure decisions are not immune
from review under Title VII or the ADEA, a court
“should exercise caution in second-guessing a tenure
decision and should not ‘sit as a super tenure-review
committee.’ ” Id. (quoting Negussey v. Syracuse Univ.,
No. 95 Civ. 1827, 1997 WL 141679, at *6 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar.24, 1997)); see also Jalal v. Columbia Univ., 4
F.Supp.2d 224, 235 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (“judges are
frequently admonished not to second-guess the merits of a
university’s collective academic judgment as to a tenure
candidate’s qualifications”) (citations omitted).

B. Application
[3]
Because the

McDonnell–Douglas
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governing law, I am bound to apply it. Rather than do so
formalistically, however, I assume that Peterson has made
out a prima facie case. Defendants have articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their
action—Peterson was denied tenure because, in the
estimation of defendants’ Executive Committee, Review
Committee, and President, she failed to meet the required
academic criteria. Hence, I proceed directly to the
ultimate question: whether Peterson has presented
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could
find discrimination. I do so by reviewing first plaintiff’s
evidence, then defendants’ evidence, and finally the
record as a whole.

1. Plaintiff’s Evidence
Peterson’s evidence of discrimination is extremely thin.
She provides no documents, no quantifiable statistics, no
statements, no depositions, and no affidavits other than
her own conclusory affidavit, consisting primarily of
speculation. She points to no circumstances, such as
unexplained adverse treatment, that could give rise to an
inference of intent to discriminate. Construing the facts in
the light most favorable to her, and drawing all reasonable
inferences in her favor, there are three broad categories of
circumstantial evidence that Peterson contends support
her discrimination claims: (1) her credentials are stronger
than those of her peers/colleagues; (2) there were
irregularities in the tenure review process; and (3) there is
a “pattern” of purportedly discriminatory treatment by
defendants against both women and older people. I
discuss each of these categories in turn.

a. Peterson’s Credentials
Peterson repeatedly alleges that her qualifications, work
performance, professional experience, and service to the
SOA exceeded those of her colleagues.
First, Peterson alleges that she was more qualified than
Jonathan Ochshorn (a younger man) for a full-time,
tenure-track position in 1982. Yet, defendants
recommended Ochshorn for the position over her.
Second, Peterson alleges that she was the most qualified
candidate for the 1985 tenure-track position, to which she
was not appointed. Both the younger female candidate,
who was selected and appointed, and the younger male
candidate, who was not selected, are alleged to have been
less qualified than Peterson for the position. Third,

Peterson alleges that the younger female who was granted
tenure the year that Peterson was denied tenure is less
qualified than Peterson. Finally, Peterson also alleges that
she carried a heavier courseload and was more involved
in SOA activities than her colleagues.
All of these allegations are debatable. Evidence in the
record establishes, as least with respect to Megan
Lawrence, Alan Feigenberg, Horst Berger, and Ghislaine
Hermanuz, that these individuals are or were
distinguished scholars and candidates in their own right.
(See Kramer Aff. Exs. 1–6; Solomon Aff. Ex. K).
Nonetheless, I assume for purposes of this motion that
Peterson’s allegations concerning her superior credentials
are true. Even if true, however, these allegations do not,
by themselves, prove discrimination. Even assuming, for
example, that Ochshorn was an “inferior” candidate
because he did not have *686 a master’s degree, he had
experience in “structure” and was ready to teach structure,
whereas Peterson had no such experience and could not
have taught the course. Hence, the fact that defendants
initially chose Ochshorn over Peterson is hardly proof of
discrimination.

b. Irregularity in Process
Peterson next contends that defendants’ tenure decision
was flawed due to a number of “irregularities” in the
process. For instance, Peterson’s personnel file does not
contain the requisite number of evaluations. In addition,
Peterson disagrees with Professor David Guise’s peer
evaluation, which was considered by defendants in
denying tenure. Guise’s evaluation stated inter alia that
“every single drawing I viewed ... which were secured on
the wall, contained major errors.” (Solomon Aff. Ex. R
(emphasis in original)). Peterson contends that Guise was
“biased” against her.
In addition, Peterson alleges that the Executive
Committee (that twice voted against her tenure
application) was not properly staffed. She notes that two
members of the Committee had to remove themselves
because they were not tenured at the time (John Loomis
and Ghislaine Hermanuz). (Peterson Aff. ¶ 41). She also
alleges that “[f]or the only time in the Executive
Committee’s history, two students were improperly
permitted to vote on my tenure review.” (Id.). As to the
Review Committee’s nearly unanimous decision against
tenure, Peterson alleges that the Review Committee
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“ignor[ed]” the SOA’s review process and that she “has
no idea which members of defendants’ Review
Committee voted on [her] tenure or whether even a proper
vote was taken.” (Id. ¶ 44).
At best, these contentions are also debatable for a number
of reasons. First, while it is true that Peterson’s personnel
file contained less than the required number of
evaluations, Peterson does not contend that she ever
complained about the scheduling of annual evaluations
and/or teaching observations. (See supra note 2). Rather,
she maintains that additional evaluations of her
performance exist, but that defendants have improperly
withheld these documents from her. As will be discussed
more fully below, I do not find that defendants have
withheld documents from Peterson.
Second, there is no evidence to support the contention that
Guise’s critical evaluation of Peterson was somehow
tainted because he was “biased” against her. Even if it
were true that Guise was “biased” against Peterson, there
is no allegation that Guise was biased against Peterson
because of her gender or age. Moreover, he later wrote
unsolicited letters supporting her tenure application.
Gebert’s Chairman’s Report, in which he recommends
Peterson for tenure, states that “[p]eer observations ... are
not uniformly positive, though one evaluator [presumably
Guise] later felt it prudent to moderate his negative
remarks in several unsolicited letters.” (Kramer Aff. Ex.
7). In addition, Guise’s evaluation was not the only
evaluation considered. Other peer evaluations of Peterson
also contained negative comments. (See Solomon Aff.
Exs. S, V).
Finally, even if there are questions concerning the
members of the Executive Committee who voted on her
tenure application, there is not a scintilla of evidence to
suggest that the proper process concerning Peterson’s
tenure application was ignored. There is also no evidence
whatsoever to suggest that the Review Committee’s vote
was somehow improper. (See Solomon Aff. Exs. V, X,
EE; Irvine Aff.; Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 12 and Ex. C).
Accordingly, Peterson has at best demonstrated that there
were some minor irregularities as to her tenure review.
Even so, however, there is nothing in the record to even
remotely suggest that these “irregularities” were
motivated by discriminatory animus against Peterson on
the basis of her gender and/or her age.

c. Pattern of Discrimination
To support her sweeping claims of discrimination,
Peterson repeatedly alleges that defendants engaged in a
pattern of discriminatory conduct on the basis of both
gender and age. Peterson, however, provides absolutely
*687 no concrete evidence—direct or indirect—to support
these wholly conclusory allegations.
For instance, Peterson alleges that Megan Lawrence was
selected and appointed to a tenure-track position over
Peterson, in 1985, “because [defendants] were under
pressure to hire a woman, but knew that [Lawrence]
would be unable to assume the position” because she was
“dying from cancer.” (Peterson Aff. ¶¶ 20–22). Although
it is true that Lawrence passed away after her appointment
(see Solomon Aff. Ex. W), there is not a shred of proof in
the record to substantiate this conclusory speculation as to
why defendants hired Lawrence or even that defendants
knew Lawrence was sick. Peterson does not identify any
source of information as to this contention, nor does she
contend that she had personal knowledge of the alleged
circumstances surrounding Lawrence’s appointment. The
suggestion that defendants hired Lawrence precisely
because they knew that she was going to die is absurd.
Another glaring example of Peterson’s lack of concrete
evidence as to purported discrimination is her contention
concerning Labelle Prussin, a woman who is older than
Peterson and who was hired with tenure in 1986. Peterson
contends that Prussin resigned in 1990 “because of the
repeatedly bad treatment she received [at the SOA]
because of her gender.” (Peterson Aff. ¶ 46). Peterson
also alleges that Prussin attempted to rescind her
resignation but the SOA refused to let her rescind it, so
“she was forced out.” (Id.).
Again, Peterson does not offer a single bit of evidence to
support this speculation. She does not offer an affidavit
from Prussin or any other member of the faculty familiar
with the alleged events in question. She does not explain
how she purportedly knew this information concerning
Prussin. She does not identify a single source of
information. Finally, she does not identify any of the
parties involved in the “repeatedly bad treatment” or even
what the treatment was or how it was related to Prussin’s
gender.
In short, Peterson has utterly failed to present evidence of
discrimination or any pattern of discriminatory conduct.
Although she speculates that every action affecting her
was based on discriminatory animus, she offers nothing
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substantive to prove it. Indeed, statistics and other
evidence in the record demonstrate no pattern of
discriminatory conduct by defendants on the basis of
gender and/or age.

2. Defendants’ Evidence
Defendants rely on evidence tending to show that
Peterson
was
denied
tenure
for
legitimate
non-discriminatory reasons. That evidence is substantial.
For instance, Harleston, upon reviewing the entire record
concerning Peterson’s tenure application, concluded that
Peterson’s:
overall record does not provide
evidence of a potential for
performance at a level that I would
expect of faculty members in the
School of Architecture being
considered for tenure at th[e] time.
It was my academic judgment that
[Peterson’s] achievements in the
areas of scholarly productivity,
research,
publication
and
professional activity were not
sufficient to warrant a tenure
appointment. During the past five
year period [Peterson’s] record of
professional
accomplishments,
publications,
and/or
research
activities have been extremely
limited in quantity and importance.
There has been no direct
contribution to the professional
literature. I found [therefore] that
[Peterson’s] work in these areas did
not constitute a body of
accomplishments that would add to
[Peterson’s] status in the profession
or would contribute to the future
growth and instructional needs of
the [SOA].

Peterson’s professional activities
have decreased substantially in the
time since she obtained a full-time
position in the School.... The
Departmental Executive Committee
[of which Gebert was a member]
voiced a great deal of concern
regarding
Prof.
Peterson’s
diminished accomplishments in the
areas of professional *688 work
and scholarship as well as her
effectiveness as a teacher in the
past several years. The [P & B]
Committee [of which Gebert was
also a member] devoted less
discussion to this issue, wishing
instead
to
emphasize
Prof.
Peterson’s length of service. The
question
remains:
Is
Prof.
Peterson’s relatively attenuated
professional development in the
past several years a relatively
short-lived
aberration
or
a
long-term downward trend?
(Kramer Aff. Ex. 7).
Countless other exhibits in this case demonstrate that
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons existed to justify
Peterson’s denial of tenure. (See Solomon Aff. Exs. A at
10, Q, R, S, V). Moreover, despite Peterson’s emphasis
on her service to the SOA, she does not dispute the fact
that the primary criteria for tenure decisions were
teaching effectiveness and scholarship and professional
growth. (See Solomon Aff. Ex. Q). Factors such as
service to the institution and service to the public are only
“supplementary considerations.” (Id.). Noticeably absent
from Peterson’s contentions regarding her superior
qualifications is any allegation as to her accomplishments
in the area of scholarly work, particularly academic
publication.
In short, defendants’ evidence of
nondiscriminatory reasons for denying
compelling.

legitimate,
tenure is

(Solomon Aff. Ex. V).
Gebert, who recommended that Peterson be reappointed
with tenure, conceded the following in his “Chairman’s
Report” that was considered by the Review Committee
and Harleston:

3. The Record as a Whole
In the end, Peterson’s “evidence” of gender and/or age
discrimination is virtually non-existent. Even assuming
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that she was more qualified than her colleagues and that
there were some minor irregularities in her tenure review,
no rational jury could conclude, on the basis of the record
as a whole, that she was discriminated against because of
her gender and/or her age. Simply put, Peterson has not
come forward with sufficient evidence to raise an issue of
fact for trial.
Peterson contends in her opposition that “[t]here is
adequate evidence in the record to show, at minimum, a
genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Ms. Peterson’s
purported failure to have sufficient scholarly works or
professional accomplishments were the true reason
defendants’ denied her tenure ... and that they were
motivated at least in part by discriminatory animus.”
(Pl.Mem. at 14). While Peterson conclusorily alleges the
existence of “adequate evidence in the record” to raise an
issue of fact, she utterly fails to point to any such
evidence.6
Moreover, Peterson’s conclusory, unsupported allegations
of discrimination are countered by defendants’ concrete
and specific proof that its conduct was legitimate and
lawful. See Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105,
109–10 (2d Cir.1994) (“some evidence is not sufficient to
withstand a properly supported motion for summary
judgment; a plaintiff opposing such a motion must
produce sufficient evidence to support a rational finding
that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons proffered
by the employer were false, and that more likely than not
the [alleged unlawful reason] was the real reason for the
[employment decision]”).
To merit a trial on Peterson’s claims, the evidence must
show that, more likely than not, defendants’ “proffered
reason was not the true reason for the employment
decision.” Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332, 1336
(2d Cir.1997) (en banc ), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075, 118
S.Ct. 851, 139 L.Ed.2d 752 (1998) (quoting St. Mary’s,
509 U.S. 502, 507–08, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407
(1993)). There is no evidence to suggest that defendants’
proffered reason for denying tenure was not the true
reason tenure was denied. Although Peterson has arguably
presented some evidence of pretext (i.e., superior
qualifications and minor irregularities in the tenure
process), it is undermined by the evidence that defendants
have submitted. Even assuming that a reasonable jury
could find pretext, no reasonable jury could conclude that
the pretext was a mask for illegal discrimination.
*689 In sum, Peterson’s tenure application was carefully

considered by individuals who were, for the most part,
intimately familiar with her qualifications and the needs
of the institution. These individuals were, for the most
part, eminently qualified to judge such issues as the
scholarliness of Peterson’s work and the strength of her
contributions to her field of study. These individuals
participated in four separate levels of review and
deliberation. Yet, Peterson now wants this Court to step in
and provide her with a fifth level of review and to
“second-guess” the tenure decision. While the Court
would not hesitate to do so were there concrete and
specific evidence of discrimination, no such evidence has
been presented in this case. Accordingly, there is no basis
upon which to disturb defendants’ decision to deny tenure
here, and no reasonable jury could conclude that Peterson
was denied tenure for a discriminatory reason.

4. Rule 56(f)
Although Peterson does not explicitly invoke
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f) in opposing defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, the contentions she makes in
opposition (and in her motion for sanctions) implicitly
raise the issue as to whether she has been afforded a
reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery.

[4]

On the record before me, I conclude that Peterson has
been afforded a full and fair opportunity to conduct
discovery in this case. Cf. Meloff v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 51 F.3d 372 374–76 (2d Cir.1995) (vacating
summary judgment where plaintiff demonstrated a lack of
opportunity to conduct discovery). Indeed, Peterson had
some five years in which to conduct discovery. Although
she continues to complain that defendants have failed to
produce requested documents, I find that defendants have
substantially complied with their obligations in discovery.
Indeed, defendants made approximately ten boxes of
documents available for Peterson to inspect (culled from
approximately 60 boxes of archived files), but she chose
to inspect only one of the ten boxes. Moreover, Peterson
cannot be heard to complain in this respect because the
record does not reflect that she conducted any
depositions.
Accordingly, to the extent that Peterson’s opposition
suggests that she has not had a full and fair opportunity to
conduct discovery, the argument is rejected.
For all the reasons stated above, defendants are entitled to
summary judgment dismissing Peterson’s discrimination
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claims.

and fees alleging that defendants failed to comply with
the November 1994 decision ordering production.

C. Retaliation
[5]
Peterson also alleges that she was denied tenure “in
retaliation for her successful pursuit for relief in a class
action against defendants for gender bias” and in
retaliation for “protesting discrimination” based on gender
and/or age. (Am.Cmplt.¶¶ 1, 32). To prevail on a claim of
retaliation, Peterson must demonstrate that: (1) she was
engaged in protected activity; (2) defendants were aware
of the activity; (3) defendants took some adverse
employment action against her; and (4) a causal
connection exists between her participation in a protected
activity and the adverse employment action. See Lapsley
v. Columbia Univ., 999 F.Supp. 506, 524 (S.D.N.Y.1998)
(citing Galdieri–Ambrosini v. National Realty and Dev.
Corp., 136 F.3d 276, 292 (2d Cir.1998)).
[6]

Construing the amended complaint in the light most
favorable to Peterson, she has alleged protected activity in
this case by noting her participation in the Melani case as
well as other alleged conduct to “protest[ ]
discrimination.” (Am.Cmplt.¶ 32). She also alleges
causation, as she contends that she was denied tenure in
retaliation for her protected activity.
These allegations, however, are purely conclusory with no
concrete support. Just as there is no support for her
discrimination claims, there is no support for her claim of
retaliation. In the face of defendants’ concrete showing
that they denied Peterson tenure for legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons, no reasonable juror could
conclude that the tenure decision was retaliatory.
Accordingly, the claim for retaliation is dismissed as well.

D. Plaintiff’s Motion
[7]
Upon review and consideration of Peterson’s motion
for sanctions (and to preclude *690 defendants from
offering a defense), the Court finds no basis upon which
to grant the relief requested.
Peterson first moved to compel production of documents
in September 1994. That motion was granted in part and
denied in part by Judge Patterson in a memorandum
decision dated November 15, 1994. (Feldmesser
Sanctions Aff. Ex. B). A year and a half later, after the
case was reassigned to me, Peterson moved for sanctions

In an order dated March 14, 1996, I denied the motion “in
all respects.” I determined that there was a delay in the
production of documents in part because of difficulties in
negotiating and executing a confidentiality agreement.
Even though those difficulties appeared to have been
resolved at a conference before Judge Patterson on
February 17, 1995, “counsel continued to bicker about the
terms of the confidentiality agreement.” (See 3/14/96
Order at 1). In view of the circumstances, I found that
defendants did not act contemptuously. (Id. at 2). I denied
Peterson’s fee request as did Judge Patterson when
Peterson originally moved to compel documents in 1994.
On April 18, 1997, I held a status conference. At the
conference, Peterson’s counsel presented a chart
containing specific documents that they wanted
defendants to produce. (Feldmesser Sanctions Aff. Ex. C).
I ordered defendants to produce the documents identified
in the chart by June 2, 1997. I also order that all discovery
in this case be completed by September 12, 1997.
In connection with Peterson’s current sanctions motion,
defendants represent that “all of the documents requested
by plaintiff have been the subject of a diligent search of
CUNY Central Office and City College files. All that
were located were either produced directly to plaintiff or
produced for inspection.” (Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 2
and Ex. B; Feldmesser Sanctions Aff. Ex. D). Defendants
deny that they have destroyed documents or have refused
to produce documents. (Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 2). I
accept these representations. Not only have defendants
provided proof that they have complied with Peterson’s
production requests in this case, again, it appears that
Peterson has not even examined all of the documents that
were made available to her by defendants. (See Solomon
Sanctions Aff. ¶¶ 4–15; Kramer Sanctions Aff. ¶¶ 9–11).
Accordingly, the request for sanctions is denied. The
motion to preclude defendants from asserting a defense in
this case, in any event, is moot.

CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion is granted and the amended
complaint is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of the
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Court shall enter judgment accordingly. Plaintiff’s motion
is denied.
SO ORDERED.

All Citations
32 F.Supp.2d 675, 84 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 165,
132 Ed. Law Rep. 321

Footnotes
1

It is not clear whether Peterson specifically applied for this position. Bond’s letter implies, however, that some formal
selection process was undertaken because it states that he had “accepted the recommendation of the Executive and
[P & B] Committees ... and [was] offering [Peterson] appointment....” (Solomon Aff.Ex. O).

2

Peterson should have been, but was not, officially evaluated every year by the Chairman of the Executive Committee.
(See Solomon Sanctions Aff.Ex. D art. 18.3(a)). But if an annual evaluation is not scheduled accordingly, it is the
employee’s responsibility to file an observation/conference form. (Id. art. 18.3(c)). Failure by an employee to file such a
form bars the employee from complaining about any failure to schedule an annual evaluation appointment. There is no
evidence that Peterson ever complied with this requirement. As to peer evaluations, observations for an entire class
period are supposed to occur at least once during each academic semester. (Id. art. 18.2(b)). Again, it is the
employee’s responsibility to file an observation/conference form if the evaluations are not scheduled accordingly, and
an employee may not subsequently complain concerning this requirement if she fails to file such form. (Id. art. 18.2(d)).
Peterson’s personnel file contains five teaching observation reports for the period after her tenure-track appointment,
about one-half of the required number. (Solomon Sanctions Aff. ¶ 7). There is no evidence that Peterson ever filed an
observation/conference form with respect to teaching observations.

3

Silberberg, in a memorandum dated October 24, 1990 to Harleston, laid out the pertinent facts concerning Peterson
and “prepared copies of pertinent documents taken from Peterson’s personnel file” to help Harleston “review her
appeal.” (See Solomon Sanctions Aff.Ex. C (10/24/90 memo)). Silberberg commented that the Peterson case is
“complicated by the fact that she worked as an adjunct for many years,” and that such long service would “work against
us in the grievance process.” (Id.). Moreover, only one annual evaluation during her tenure-track appointment was
prepared by Dean Bond in the spring of 1989. (Id.). Finally, Silberberg commented that Peterson’s personnel file
contained only about half the required number of peer classroom evaluations. (Id.).

4

The individuals hired are as follows: (1) Horst Berger (male; DOB 6/ 28 ; hired 9/90); (2) Jerrilyn Dodds (female; DOB
2/51; hired 9/90); (3) Alan Feigenberg (male; DOB 4/44; hired 9/88); (4) Ghislaine Hermanuz (female; DOB 4/42; hired
9/86); (5) Megan Lawrence (female; deceased); (6) John Loomis (male; DOB 8/51; hired 9/88); (7) Cynthia Peterson
(female; DOB 3/37; hired 9/86); (8) Labelle Prussin (female; DOB 1/29; hired with tenure 2/87; resigned); and (9)
Leland Weintraub (male; DOB 11/51; hired 9/89).

5

Peterson contends that the withdrawal of her appeal “was moot, null and void because I was about to receive a
full-time tenure track position through other means .... [and that she does not remember receiving] any funds or relief
under the Melanie [sic] consent decree.” (Peterson Aff. ¶ 25; see also Peterson Mem. at 2–3). It is not clear what
Peterson is attempting to establish by making this contention. There is no question that she was a member of the
Melani class. Thus, Peterson is not entitled to relief in this case based on any claim of discrimination for conduct that
pre-dates September 10, 1984.

6

It is telling that in her 56.1 Statement, Peterson cites only to her own affidavit, with the exception of four citations to
defendants’ exhibits (including, exhibits concerning Lawrence’s appointment (Exs.K, L); CUNY’s tenure policy (Ex. Q);
and one peer evaluation containing a positive remark about Peterson (Ex. S)).
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